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Summary
Internet-of-Thing (IoT) is a rapid-emerging technology that exploits the concept of inter-network
to connect things such as physical devices and objects together. A huge number of things (6.4 bil-
lion are in use in 2016) are already acting without direct human control raising a lot of concerns
about the readiness and appropriateness of existing security practices, techniques, and tools to
secure the data collected and protect people’s private lives. As a first step, this paper presses
the importance of having a dedicated process for vetting IoT (by analogy to vetting mobile apps)
with focus on exposing things’ vulnerabilities that could be the primary source of attacks. These
vulnerabilities are identified according to things’ duties decomposed into sensing, actuating, and
communicating. A set of questions shed light on things’ vulnerabilities per type of duty.
KEYWORDS:
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1 MOTIVATIONS
In the 21st century, security, confidentiality, integrity, and privacy are prevalent concerns to the extent that the Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) community is putting tremendous efforts into addressing them. The number of ICT-basedmisuse and fraudulent cases are on the
rise calling for a serious revisionof existing practices, techniques, and tools.Oneof thesepractices is tovet ICTapplications prior to their integration
into real (sometimes critical) business operations. Mobile apps exemplify ICT applications whose rapid and uncontrolled widespread has become a
major concern to policy makers. As of March 2017, there were 2.8 million apps posted on Google Play Store and 2.2 million apps posted on Apple’s
App Store, the 2 leading app stores in the world (www.statista.com/topics/1002/mobile-app-usage).
In conjunction with the mobile apps “fever”, we observe some early signs of another “fever” that the Internet-of-Things (IoT) could end-
up catching. 6.4 billion connected things were in use in 2016, up 3% from 2015, and will reach 20.8 billion by 2020 according to Gartner
(www.gartner.com/en/newsroom). The wireless world research forum also predicted that by 2017, there will be 7 trillion wireless devices serv-
ing 7 billion people leading to the formation of the IoT 1. Are all these IoT-compliant things (things, for short) safe, secure, and trustworthy? Can
we integrate them into critical systems? What are their vulnerabilities? To address these questions, why don’t we begin by vetting things like
the ICT community does with mobile apps? “The IoT era not only brings new opportunities, but also presents an expanded attach surface, already being
exploited by cyber criminals” (go.armis.com/iot-security-buyers-guidev5) and “IoT devices can and do get hacked regularly, and the consequences are
severe” (internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/blog/IoT-Agenda/How-can-anomalous-IoT-device-activity-be-detected).
The limited R&D initiatives on Vetting IoT (VIoT) is accentuated by the heavy dependence of ICT practitioners on the security pub-
lic claims of things’ vendors. In a 2017 survey by Osterman Research, Inc. upon the request of Trustwave (www.trustwave.com/en-
us/resources/library/documents/iot-cybersecurity-readiness), some key takeaways are that “nearly three in five organizations can attribute some type
of security incident to their IoT devices” and “IT departments charged with vetting IoT devices rely too heavily on IoT vendors’ security claims and too little
on internal testing, third-party testing and published reviews of the devices they connect to their networks”. Things in the IoT are not always collaborative,
cooperative, and predictable 2. By analogy to vetting mobile apps 3, we aim at developing the necessary concepts, principles, and techniques for
vetting things by considering their intrinsic characteristics namely, reduced size, restricted connectivity, continuous mobility, limited energy, and
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constrained storage. Our main objectives in the VIoT project are (i) to define vetting in the context of IoT, (ii) to identify security vulnerabilities of
things (focus of this paper), (iii) to define things’ duties that could be subject to such vulnerabilities, and (iv) to develop and/or illustrate techniques
that could address these vulnerabilities. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief overview of vetting mobile apps and secu-
rity of IoT. Section 3 discusses our vision of developing a comprehensive VIoT process. Section 4 concludes the paper by presenting our current
efforts into this process.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we first define the concept of vetting mobile apps and then, discuss some initiatives related to security of IoT. We base our
VIoT process on vettingmobile apps’ best practices and techniques.
2.1 Vettingmobile apps in brief
According to theUSNational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 4, there is a need to securemobile apps from vulnerabilities and defects;
apps are used by all people and all organizations. To satisfy this need, a strict vetting process would ensure that mobile apps comply with an orga-
nization’s security requirements and are to a certain extent free of (serious) vulnerabilities. These requirements could be related to origin, data
sensitivity, and target environment and could be split into (i) general with respect to some known standards and best practices like those specified
by NIAP, OWASP, MITRE, and NIST, and (ii) specific with respect to some organizations’ internal policies, regulations, and guidelines. Factors that
cause app vulnerabilities include design flaws and programming errors, which could have been inserted intentionally or inadvertently 4. Depending
on the risk tolerance of an organization, some vulnerabilitiesmight bemore serious than others calling for a contextualized vetting process. Vetting
could occur throughout an app’s lifecycle that consists of development, acquisition, and deployment stages and would cover correctness testing,
source and binary code testing, and static and dynamic testing.
Quirolgico et al. mention that millions of apps for mobile devices are out there through commercial stores and open repositories 3. Because
of their low cost and widespread, the threats of their vulnerabilities could be far greater than that of traditional computers. And, because some
vulnerabilities of mobile apps are unique, Quirolgico et al. insist on the urgency of having a quick and cost efficient vetting process.
2.2 Security of IoT in brief
Compared to vetting mobile apps (Section 2.1), there is a major gap in VIoT. IoT mixes physical processes with digital (cyber) connectivity mak-
ing it different from other software-related disciplines. The first set of references that we reviewed are more concerned with the security and
privacy of IoT applications than by developing a comprehensive guide for vetting things that would reveal their vulnerabilities. And, the second
set of references run tests to identify vulnerabilities of IoT devices that are already in operation. There is a consensus that IoT is vastly impact-
ing the way we view, use, and interact with smart devices 5. However, security remains a concern that could turn IoT misuse into a nightmare;
such devices collect and use of a lot of personal data on their users. McKinsey argues that security may represent the greatest obstacle to IoT
growth (www.mckinsey.com/industries/semiconductors/our-insights/security-in-the-internet-of-things). And, Creager discussesways of detecting
IoT devices’ suspicious activities 6. Devices are monitored for proper behavior, and those that show signs of having been interfered with can have
their behaviors mitigated and security issue eliminated. Monitoring implies that devices are already in operation, which could be late since these
devices were not vet.
In a 2018 report byKEYFACTOR (www.keyfactor.com), the authors discuss cases of IoT devices that have been subject to attacks although these
devices were critical to humans’ lives. Vetting IoT devices would have helped prevent or at least reduce such cases by exposing their vulnerabil-
ities ahead of time. In the healthcare domain, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recalled, in 2017, 465K pacemakers after discovering
security flaws that could allow hackers to drain device batteries or sendmalicious instructions tomodify a patient’s heartbeat. Vetting pacemakers
could have prevented such a serious case. Similar news is reported in the automotive industry when a Jeep Cherokee was hijacked turning off the
transmission while the vehicle was on the freeway. Attacks also target robotic vehicles like drones and ground rovers 7. Choi et al. consider robotic
vehicles as a type of cyber-physical systems that consist of both cyber and physical components working jointly to support the vehicle’s operations
in the physical world. The authors enumerate many cases (e.g., GPS spoofing and ABS tampering) that show how vulnerable robotic vehicles are to
attacks and suggest an invariant approach to address some vulnerabilities.
Out of themultiple references thatwe reviewed, theworks of Palavicini Jr. et al. 8 and Siboni et al. 9 nicely overlapwith our objectives.On the one
hand, Palavicini Jr. et al. apply symbolic analysis to vet, in a semi-automatedway, Industrial IoT (IIoT)firmware using angr, a UCSanta Barbara binary
analysis framework 10, andMecanical Phish, a component from the same university’s cyber reasoning system, to perform semi-automated analysis
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of IIoT. The authors mention that embedded systems and IIoT devices are rapidly increasing in number and complexity. As a result, cyber-physical
attacks have become omnipresent causing economic and physical damages. They also mention that the firmware for these systems has become
difficult to analyze when searching for malicious functionalities. Their approach consists of 3 steps: preparation of the firmware image for loading
into the angr framework, emulation for verification of discovered vulnerabilities, and analysis of the firmware sample “angr style”.
On the other hand, Siboni et al. discuss a security testbed for IoT devices that iTrust Lab has developed 9. First they report on the experience
of using an IoT search engine, SHODAN (www.shodan.io), to discover several vulnerabilities of IoT devices. It is worth noting that this experience
targeted devices that were already in operation while we insist that vetting aims at detecting vulnerabilities prior to putting devices into operation
(prevention is always better than correction). iTrust testbed emulates different types of testing environments that simulate the activity of multi-
ple sensors and perform predefined and customized security tests along with advanced security testing analysis. Siboni et al. break down security
aspects of IoT devices into 4 parts: device architecture that investigates attacks on hardware and software; network connectivity that investigates
attacks ondata distribution; data collection that investigates data collectionwith regard toprivacy invasion and information theft; and,finally, coun-
termeasures and mitigation that investigate how to reduce the security and privacy risks that IoT devices pose. The testbed’s capabilities include
initialization anddetection, security tests, logging and analysis, usability, security aspects in termsof reliability, antiforensic, security, accountability,
and finally adaptive in terms of scalability, performance, and flexibility.
3 VETTING IOT-COMPLIANT THINGS
In this section we provide a definition of VIoT, identify things’ duties, and then discuss some vulnerabilities that could undermine the normal
operation of these duties. A comprehensiveVIoT process is deemed necessary.
3.1 Overview
According toCrewsandMangal 11, themassive arrival of smartphones andmobile appshas triggereda “mini-revolution” in the softwareengineering
discipline. Some concepts, principles, and practices like those related to testing have been reviewed, for example. Touchscreen gestures, location
awareness, and orientation need to be tested differently. The same is valid when testing IoT smart devices and, also, vetting them.We expect that
IoT features such as reduced size, restricted connectivity, continuous mobility, limited energy, constrained storage, and additional features that
Kamrani et al. 12 discuss, will trigger a similar “revolution”.
By analogy to the NIST definition of app vetting process 4, VIoT process would be a sequence of stages that an organization would perform to
declare if a thing is “clean” (in terms of safety, security, trustworthiness, etc.) with respect to some IoT safety and security requirements/guideli-
nes/policies. Our sequence of 4 stages represented in Fig. 1 would consist of defining things’ duties that would be subject to vetting, identifying
the vulnerabilities that would affect these duties, analyzing the impact of these vulnerabilities on these duties, and developing guidelines and/or











FIGURE 1 4 stages of the proposedVIoT process
3.2 Duties of things
In a previous work 13, we identified 3 single duties that would capture a thing’s capabilities in terms of sensing (collecting/capturing data), actuating
(processing/acting upon data), and communicating (sharing/distributing data). A duty is either enabled or disabled ((0,1) in Fig. 2) according to the
requirements and needs of the under-development IoT applications.
In terms of duties, a thing senses the cyber-physical surrounding so, that, it generates (raw) data; a thing actuates data including those that are
sensed; and a thing communicates with the cyber-physical surrounding the sensed and/or actuated data. Accepting data and/or commands from
external parties (e.g., other things) is also taken care by the communicating duty but is not further discussed in this report. It is worth noting that













FIGURE 2Duties associated with a thing
a thing’s sensing, actuating, and communicating duties can be composed together as per the following 4 representative cases (other cases like
Communicating→Actuating and Communicating→Actuating→Sensing are not discussed):
1. Sensing→Actuating→Communicating: sensed data are passed on to actuating; and the data that result from actuation are passed on to
communicating for distribution.
2. Sensing→Actuating: sensed data are passed on to actuating; and the data that result from actuation are finals.
3. Sensing→Communicating: sensed data are passed on to communicating for distribution.
4. Actuating→Communicating: data that result from actuating are passed on to communicating for distribution.
3.3 Vulnerabilities of things
As per Fig. 1, our VIoT process proceeds with the definition of things’ duties and then, identification of potential vulnerabilities that could impact
the completion of these duties. Although some thing vulnerabilities that could constitute sources of attacks are already identified in the context of
the OWASP IoT project (www.owasp.org), we find these vulnerabilities generic and not focused on IoT features nor things’ duties. To address this
limited focus, we present in the following some questions that would help identify vulnerabilities of some duties, whether simple or composite. By
addressing these questions, we aim in the future at recommending techniques and/or practices that would mitigate such vulnerabilities (stage 4).
Due to lack of space, only sensing and actuating as single duties, and only sensing→ actuating as a composite duty, are discussed.
• Questions related to vetting sensing include, but are not limited to:
1. Does sensing target living (e.g., persons) and/or non-living things (e.g., rooms)? And, what are we sensing? Ambient temperature, wind
speed, heartbeat, etc.? Vulnerabilities: sensing things without their approval and sensing something different thanwhat is claimed.
2. Does sensing target indoor, outdoor, or both? Vulnerabilities: sensing something different thanwhat is claimed.
3. What is the frequency of sensing such as continuously, at regular intervals, or trigger-based? Vulnerabilities: changing sensing
frequency without approval and sensing differently fromwhat is claimed.
4. Who does configure sensing in terms of frequencies, service periods, authorized recipients, etc.? And, does configuration have to hap-
pen fromaspecific location and/or using a specificdevice?Vulnerabilities: unauthorizedpersonproceedswith configuring sensingusing
a non-acceptable device and/or from an unacceptable location.
5. What is the resource consumption level of sensing? And, is there any threshold that would indicate over-consumption and hence,
trigger alarms? Vulnerabilities: tampering sensing’s approved resource consumption-level so, that, over consumption goes unnoticed.
6. Are there traces of tracking sensing using logs, for example? If yes, how are these traces safeguarded? Vulnerabilities: altering tracking
traces of sensing and distributing traces to unauthorized parties.
• Questions related to vetting actuating include, but are not limited to:
1. Can a thing cancel and/or compensate the outcomes of actuating? If yes, does it need any approval? Vulnerabilities: canceling and/or
compensating actuating outcomes without approval.
Maamar ET AL. 5
2. What is the frequency of actuating such as continuously, at regular intervals, or trigger-based? Vulnerabilities: changing actuating
frequency without approval and actuating differently fromwhat is claimed.
3. Who does configure actuating in terms of frequencies, service periods, etc.? And, does configuration have to happen from a spe-
cific location and/or using a specific device? Vulnerabilities: unauthorized person proceeds with actuating configuration using a
non-acceptable device and/or from an unacceptable location.
4. What inputs does actuating require? And, what outputs does actuating produce?Vulnerabilities: altering inputs and outputs purposely.
5. Are there tracesof tracking actuatingusing logs, for example? If yes, howare these traces safeguarded?Vulnerabilities: altering tracking
traces of actuating and distributing traces to unauthorized parties.
6. What is the resource consumption level of actuating? And, is there any threshold that would indicate over-consumption and hence,
trigger alarms?Vulnerabilities: tampering actuating’s approved resource consumption-level so, that, over consumption gets unnoticed.
• Questions related to vetting sensing→ actuating include, but are not limited to:
1. Are sensing and actuating frequencies synchronized, or not? Vulnerabilities: changing frequencies of sensing and actuating without
approval or making sensing and actuating (un)synchronize though it is not mandatory.
2. How and by whom sensing and actuating are configured? And, does configuration have to happen from a specific location using a
specific device? Vulnerabilities: unauthorized person proceeds with sensing and actuating configuration using a non-acceptable device
and/or from an unacceptable location.
3. Does actuating consider all sensed data as is or does actuating pre-process sensed data before? Vulnerabilities: altering sensed-data
outputs and therefore sensed-data inputs to actuating.
4. What is the resource consumption level of sensing and actuating? And, is there any threshold that would indicate over-consumption
and hence, trigger alarms? Vulnerabilities: tampering sensing and actuating’s approved resource consumption-level so, that, over con-
sumption gets unnoticed.
5. Are there traces of tracking sensing and actuating using logs, for example? If yes, how are these traces safeguarded? Vulnerabilities:
altering tracking traces of sensing and actuating and distributing traces to unauthorized parties.
4 CONCLUSION
IoT systems encompass many heterogeneous things that are connected together via Internet technologies and protocols to communicate and
exchange data with each other and their surrounding environment. These complex systems have some associated vulnerabilities and issues that,
once occurred, are destructive. By analogy to vetting mobile apps, it is extremely important to address the lack of principles, techniques, and tools
for vetting things in preparation for their integration into mission-critical systems, for example. Things have got vulnerabilities that should be “dis-
covered" through proper vetting. Unfortunately, this is not happening!! Rather than sensing a turbine’s steam level, a thing could collect some
sensitive data about the turbinewithout users’ knowledge and leak these data to third parties. In this paper, we illustrated thefirst steps of ourVIoT
process that should help promote a better and safe IoT. We defined things’ duties that are subject to vetting and identified their vulnerabilities. In
compliance with Fig. 1 our ongoing work is to analyze the impact of these vulnerabilities on things’ duties and to develop guidelines against these
vulnerabilities prior to thing deployment into real-world scenarios.
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